I. INTRODUCTION
This study canvasses the interaction between terror threat announcements and the civil liberties/collective security balance during the three years after September 11, 2001 . Part II considers how security threat environments alter the parity between collective security and civil liberties, but emphasizes that this shift is typically not from real, verified peril, but from perception of risk.' Part I11 addresses notable post-9/11 threat warnings and the detention of terror suspects.2 It inquires whether terror threat notifications were prudently issued and an imperative mechanism to apprise the populace of realistic and verified risks. In most cases, it is not clear that detainees' interrogations or interviews sourced the announcements.
3 A repercussion from ardent portrayals of danger is that irrational perceptions may skew informed public choice. 4 Part IV examines alternative global, diurnal dangers to objectify the threat of terrorism.
5 Part V concludes the work by summarizing these elements in a pithy game theory analysis. people become afraid." 23 Reflecting on judicial deference to executive crackdowns during real or perceived crises in Britain, Professor Dyzenhaus opined: " [A] fter the fact the majority judgments tend to be regarded as 'badges of shame,' and it is the ,,24 dissenting judgments that are seen as charting the correct course for the future. In 1987, Justice Brennan stated: "After each perceived security crisis ended, the US remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along." 25 A similar era followed after 9/11.26
B. Post-9/11 Institutions that Marginalized Dissent
After 9/11, new regulatory frameworks were adopted that emphasized collective security, but institutions lamentably compromised more rigorous protection of individual liberties.
2 7 The Patriot Act 28 was enacted and extended the Bush Administration's authority to wiretap, detain suspects, and deport noncitizens.
2 9 The Act morphed customarily understood definitions of terrorism by applying policies underlying prosaic criminal law offenses. The Act defined "domestic terrorism" as "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; [or] . . . appear to be intended . .
. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion." 3 0 Connoting that the stigma and harm inherent in terrorism is tantamount to a violation of criminal law seems unnecessarily vague, while an unreasonable interpretation of "intimidation or coercion" might endanger First Amendment rights of free speech and protest. Author Abdus-Sattar Ghazali wrote:
The so-called War on Terror has seriously compromised the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. From the USA PATRIOT Act's over-broad definition of domestic terrorism, to the FBI's new powers of search and surveillance, to the indefinite detention of both citizens and non-citizens without formal charges, the principles of free speech, due process, and equal protection under the law have been seriously undermined. 31 Ostensibly, Americans irresolutely permitted civil liberty values to be contravened, and accepted more intrusive law enforcement processes to remain safe, 32 although the means to substantiate this espoused imperative need is premised on secretive data.
3 3 And, equivalent to the aforementioned security threat eras, 34 citizens may not have held a rational understanding of the costs of sacrificing liberties and the benefits achieved at the time deeper security measures were imposed. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, the Justice Department spurred confusion by presenting inaccurate statements about the Patriot Act in the media. Simplistic conceptions prevailed amid erupting controversy.
The title "Patriot Act" served as a heuristic device to further conformity and marginalize dissent as unpatriotic, even though an August 2005 Associated Press poll revealed that only forty-two percent of Americans were able to identify the purpose of the Patriot Act. 37 Despite that the balance between civil liberties and 
32.
Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 30, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/2173160 ("Bush [Aidministration officials have now reprioritized 'freedom from fear' as the number-one freedom we need to preserve. Freedom from fear has become the obsessive watchword of America's human-rights policy.").
33.
There were frequent assertions that the "war on terrorism" was an effective protective measure, which espouses that a higher utilitarian purpose was being achieved. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage claimed that there is "clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight" against terrorism. 
34.
See supra notes 17-26.
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Press bill=hll0-1955 . This Act claimed the need to "prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States," and that these concerns were a "threat to homeland security." Id. § 899B(1)-(2). It proposed that a Commission be established to assess ideologically unsound beliefs. Id. § 899(C).
44.
See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION typically expand unreviewable executive secrecy prerogatives. 45 The President and the appointed members of the National Security Council control the classification and declassification of national security information, determine who is authorized to possess classified materials, and signal the extent that those who possess security clearances will be prosecuted for transgressions. 46 The problem of secrecy became so unfavorable during the Bush Administration that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) initiated legal action against Vice President Cheney in 2002, and proffered in its filing statement that this was "'the first time that the GAO has filed suit against a federal official in connection with a records access issue.... Nevertheless, given GAO's responsibility to Congress and the American people, we have no other choice.",A 7 The suit was dismissed and there was no appeal. 48 Courts traditionally grant the government discretion when security threats are alleged and only minimally review the resulting executive action.
4 9 A 2004 Congressional study observed that there was "a consistent pattern in the [Bush] Administration's actions: laws that are designed to promote public access to information have been undermined, while laws that authorize the government to withhold information or to operate in secret have been expanded."
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The Patriot Act and other measures might not have been perceived as necessary without cognitively available terror threat announcements that fostered the expectation of a dire need to foil probable attacks. 5 
48.
Kirtley, supra note 47, at 485-86 (stating the GAO lawsuit was followed by lawsuits by Judicial Watch, Inc. and the Sierra Club, which were also subsequently dismissed by the federal appellate court after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the issues back to the appellate court).
49. ) (noting that Governor Thomas Kean, head of the 9/11 Commission, remarked "that three-quarters of the classified documents that he read in preparation for the Commission's report should not have been classified" and that "[a] National Archives audit found that one-third of the records re-classified by the CIA and other agencies in 2005 were wrongly kept secret").
51.
Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter remarks: "The more we're afraid, the more you ask us to give-Patriot Act 11, enhancements to the Patriot Act-now the budgets starting to be bankrupted, billions flowing out of this country ... into a war on terror." HUACKING CATASTROPHE: 9/11 FEAR & SELLING AMERICAN EMPIRE (Media Education Foundation 2006) (Interview with Ritter). Emeritus Professor Chalmers Johnson notes: "Perpetual war, the loss of civil liberties, the lack of trust in government because they don't tell the truth. These are outrageous and unpleasant political developments." Id. (Interview with Johnson). "It has been far from becoming to have the remarkably costly silliness we have seen in the measures devoted to domestic security." Anastaplo, supra note 23, at 149. In July 2007, the Bush Administration was offering security threats in the national media, which then placed pressure on the Democrat-controlled Congress to expand eavesdropping orders to institute the terror warning system and the color-coded threat level classification, 52 and publicized terror threat warnings. The media customarily portrayed the United States as a "nation under siege," 5 even though there is scant evidence that terror alerts correlated with a genuine risk of strike. 54 There have been no terrorist attacks on United States soil since 9/11,5' and University of Pennsylvania Political Science Professor Ian Lustick reminds us that there has been no credible evidence of "sleeper cells," "attacks," or "preparation for an attack." 56 Warnings were often ambiguous, general announcements that caused confusion over how to prepare.
57 A GAO study surveyed twenty-eight agencies and concluded that the color-coded announcement system was obscure and confusing for law enforcement officials, that they "did not receive specific threat information and guidance," and that the warnings "hindered their ability . . . to determine and implement protective measures." 5 8 Attorney General John Ashcroft expressed to Congress that it was critical for national security to maintain secrecy over classified information, but he also wanted to increase public awareness of the threat. 59 The peril and the computed threat level derived from classified data.
Discussing the method in which government officials prevalently furnished terror warnings to the media, former United Nations weapons inspector Scott Ritter recounted: "We have an intelligence report that terrorists are about to strike, 'who?, ' 
B. Examples of Threat Announcements
In the case of security threat announcements, the ultimate source is apt to be the United States Intelligence Community (IC) since it possesses national security data. 63 For many Americans, the IC, as the ultimate source, may increase the credibility of a public announcement.M However, the IC's obligation to gather data is separate from the authority to declassify intelligence.
6 5 Administration officials control the national security apparatus and choose whether to release threat announcements. 66 Granted, some reports were excessively peculiar and taxing to unveil from where they originated. For example, news releases postulated that terrorists could use pen guns, hijack ferries, pack explosives into model airplanes for missions, target cattle, or attack residents in small towns. 67 However, some of the significant public announcements that ostensibly derived from classified data follow.
On It was unclear if terrorists and equipment were prepared to carry out operations, if Zubaydah was conveying admiration for the targeting and destructive capabilities of the monster in the movie, or if there was additional information that enhanced credibility to the alleged plot. Nonetheless, based on Zubaydah's interrogations, Attorney General John Ashcroft disclosed: "Recent intelligence reports suggest that al Qaeda leaders have emphasized planning for attacks on apartment buildings, hotels, or other soft or lightly secured targets in the United States." 74 To produce its report, the 9/11 Commission Report relied heavily on statements made by the CIA's detainees, but Commissioners were never given access to the detainees or tapes.
7 ' Later, against the order of federal courts and Congress, the CIA apparently destroyed interrogation tapes of Zubaydah and
69.
Id.
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The 90. SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 137-38; Scheppele, supra note 82, at 319-20 ("The chemical weapons that one can realistically imagine al Qaeda being able to make would cause little damage; the successful delivery of really harmful chemicals poses enormous scientific and logistical challenges.").
91. SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 137-38. Store owners began to sell numerous chemical suits and gas masks and there were people who duct-taped their houses. Walmart reported that gun sales surged 70% and ammunition sales increased 140% after 9/11. Moore, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE, supra note 67 (excerpting local news and commentary). Companies sold steel "safe rooms" for their houses. Moore, FAHRENHEIT 9/11, supra note 62 (excerpting local news and commentary); SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 16 (noting the perception of risk made "people afraid and ready to comply with the government's agenda").
92.
Countdown, supra note 68.
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Id On August 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security raised the alert status for financial centers in New York, New Jersey, and Washington to orange.99 On October 6, based on federal warnings, New York City officials announced a bomb threat to the city's subway systems. 00 Local news disclosed that it was given the threat notification several days earlier, but federal authorities told them to "hold off" on making the announcement. 0 ' Other media outlets later reported that the source for the warning was an informant who simply "made it up." 1 0 2 C. Interrogation, Detention, and Convictions of Suspects As for terrorists who might carry out operations, such as those referred to in threat announcements, administration officials provided projections of the perceived threat shortly after 9/11. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained: "This is a network that has penetrated into some 60 countries, including very definitely our own and it has got to be rooted out ... Our intelligence priority in many ways, is getting after the network here in the United States first."' 0 3
Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft presented wide-ranging estimates of between one thousand and five thousand terror suspects inside the United States.10 The apparent assumption was that legal and illegal resident foreigners could have
96.
James 6 Thirty months after 9/11, as many as 5,000 individuals had been apprehended and held, at least temporarily, as terror suspects.1 7 Prosecutors claimed to find evidence to charge several of those detained and one was convicted.'18 Yet at the time, Bush remarked of accomplishments: "We've thwarted terrorists in Buffalo and Seattle, Portland, Detroit, North Carolina, and Tampa, Florida."ll 9 Professor Cole reflected on the referenced achievements:
They say "terrorist sleeper cell." That's what . . . they call the Lackawanna [Buffalo] people a terrorist sleeper cell, the Detroit people a terrorist cell, the Portland people a terrorist cell. But when you look at the details, the facts just don't support that, and they have not proved that any group within the United States has plotted to engage in any terrorist activity within the United States in all of the cases they have brought since 9/11.120
In the Detroit case, four Arab men were arrested on suspicion of being an alQaeda sleeper cell.121 The prosecution claimed that the defendants' video taken at Disneyland was replete with furtive messages to provide cell members with locations to position bombs.1 22 It was later revealed that the government's sole witness, a man named Youssef Hmimssa, had twelve aliases and was wanted for fraud across the United States.1 23 Two of the four were convicted, but the verdicts were overturned when Hmimssa conceded that he invented the allegations because estimating 1,200) . Given that these were foreigners in the U.S. being targeted, it should be noted that on any given day thousands of individuals are detained by the U.S. Similarly, the Bush Administration hailed the Buffalo arrest as another successfully foiled terror plot. 12 6 The evidence was an e-mail sent by Mr. al-Bakri to his friends in Bahrain that expressed he would be getting married and would not be seeing them for a while.1 27 The CIA interpreted this as a hidden message of a plot to conduct a suicide mission.
12 8 However, al-Bakari was indeed getting married.
12 9 In the case, six men pled guilty for traveling to an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, but there was no evidence that the men participated in or planned any terrorist act. 30 In addition to eagerly speculating that wrongdoing was afoot, presumptions about intent to engage in terrorism evidently merged with standard criminal justice processes. For example, recall that the Patriot Act defined "domestic terrorism" as "acts dangerous to human life that are violations of criminal laws." The ostensible leap in logic was that someone who committed a criminal act, intended to commit a criminal act, or violated immigration laws, might also possess a terrorist mens rea. Prior to 9/11, terrorism was treated as a criminal act and defendants were prosecuted under criminal racketeering laws.' 3 ' However, the Bush Administration initiated confusion by reversing the inference and conjecturing that criminal acts might be analogized to or be a harbinger to terrorism. Perhaps following this supposition or something related was what led the pool of suspects to expand uncontrollably. A presidential directive, issued in September 2003, required government agencies to supply names and information about people "known or appropriately suspected to be . . . engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism."
136 Despite parameters, the "terrorism watch list"-that was derived from classified information-grew to 325,000 names (2006), to 700,000 (2007), and to 900,000 (2008) and was considered "virtually useless."
37

D. Rationale for Announcements
Were the terror threat announcement system and the broadly-applied detention and interrogation approaches reasonable? Was there a sagacious balance between secrecy and openness? After all, the National Security Act Let the terrorists among us be warned ... If you overstay your visa-even by one day-we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.
Id. at 247; Cole & Lobel, supra note 132 (noting that as of June 2006, there were only two cases involving attempted terrorist activity while the Justice Department claimed there were 261 convictions and guilty pleas of "terrorism or terrorism related" offenses). after 9/11 national security data was employed to issue an abundant number of warnings and maneuver the color-coded terror threat level.'" 9 There were no attacks on United States soil after 9/11 and all that remained was bewilderment over why so many threats were announced.1
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER FIVE: ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIME, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE
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There was a further potential indication of the pattern in 2009. After a suspect was arrested for allegedly planning to bomb a plane, former Vice President Cheney and Republicans "mounted a communications campaign advocating that threats exist that the current President does not properly acknowledge and address with appropriate policies."'41 Professor Lobel remarked that the former Vice President's position was that "if there is just a one percent chance of the unimaginable happening, we have to treat that chance as a certainty."
42 This is likely true of authorities being vigilant, and there is no discernible reason that demonstrates President Obama's law enforcement policies do not take realistic threats seriously. However, is Cheney's philosophy also implicit in an approach which favors liberally-issuing terror warnings? Clearly, thwarting terrorism is not coterminous with imbuing national discourse with peril to make threats cognitively available.1 43 More confounding is that publicizing severe danger, premised upon classified data that ultimately did not substantiate crisis or urgency, followed by faulty American perceptions regarding those threats,'" was the same sequence for all the unsound pre-war intelligence allegations about Iraq.1 4 5
Alternatively, it might be logical to release warnings to the media if there is a reasonable belief that Americans could be safer by exercising extra vigilance when driving over bridges and going to shopping malls and stadiums. Maybe Americans could detect a suspicious situation and thwart a terror plot. Or, hypothetically, perhaps issuing a warning announces to a potential terrorist that a plot or cell was discovered and prevents a strike from occurring. Yet, even if there is an underlying rationale, it is not clear that notifications were substantiated. Relying on rumors, such as those that led to the war in Iraq,1 46 or raw data and "chatter" from the
139.
See supra Part III (B 
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Id. The SSCI's investigation concluded from interviews of over a hundred analysts that "following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the trade craft of terrorism analysis shifted and analysts now feel obligated to make more conclusive assessments regardless of the quality of the available intelligence." SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE
NSA's Echelon surveillance, 147 may not be the foremost sources to buttress public threat warnings. The portrayal may beget emotive public reactions and a failure to objectively and rationally assess danger.
IV. A MORE SOBER RISK CALCULATION
A. Rhetoric Elevates Risk Perceptions
Professor Daniel Reisberg explains that "people regularly overestimate the frequency of events that are, in actuality, quite rare."148 Since people exaggerate the frequency of vivid and emotional risks, 149 they may not objectively or appropriately calculate excessively-portrayed dangers. 5 o Risks are a matter of perspective--one could view the world as inherently dangerous or inherently safe. Statistical evidence confirms that the high standard of living in the industrialized world and medical technology advances have gradually decreased health threats and made people safer, but the post-9/11 fear of terrorism inflicted Americans like never before."' Professor Michael Ignatieff encouraged a more sober perspective to "distinguish moral condemnation from threat assessment" and divorce emotions of ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 31 (July 7, 2004) . The Deputy Director at the CIA's CTC Office of Terrorism Analysis explained that:
[W]e've encouraged and developed a sense of trade craft specifically on terrorism that says push the envelope because the implications are so high and because we have to acknowledge up front that ... we have to accept that often our information is going to be fragmentary and, if we wait too long to reach conclusions, we might make a mistake.
Id. However, using a more aggressive investigatory lens inside the intelligence apparatus, does not assume that those more cautious estimates must be announced in the national media. When public perceptions accentuate dread, imminent danger permits the president to utilize war power under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution." 7 Dr. Saby Ghoshray asked, "How, then, can one determine this imminent threat? Perhaps a better framework could be to identify the factors that are used in the presidential manipulation of the perception of fear."
158 That is an excellent question and one that springs an additional query to mind. How frequently did President Bush provide a major speech that did not incorporate 9/11, threats or terrorism? After 9/11, Bush Administration rhetoric portrayed that the world had one exigency.
15 9 Bush announced on the evening of 9/11 that "our way of life, our very freedom came under attack." 1 6 0 He identified the mens rea: "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. Professor Addis remarked that the "rhetoric of the war on terror" was undermining American government institutions and individual rights, and "leading to what Jacques Derrida has referred to as an 'autoimmune disorder"'-a "social crisis shapes the identity of the body politic just as a medical crisis shapes the physical body."' 87 After all, the Bush Administration represented that the battle was an "unending" war on terror, ' or a fight that "could last several generations."' 89 Evoking the concept of war as temporally uncertain expands presidential power.' 90 Even after the Bush Administration departed from office, some asserted that there was still the "specter of a universal enemy,"' 9 ' that "the number and geographic range of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks has been growing each year,"'92 and that looser social movements may pose a serious terror threat. Did an era of frequent threat announcements and excessive consternation over terrorism during the Bush Administration influence societal perspectives? Prior to 9/11, would preemptive action in cases analogous to the aforementioned have been regarded as actions to confront suspects posing potential dangers to themselves and others, or as thwarting foreseeable criminal acts, instead of subjects in the war on terrorism? If the highly-emotive word "terrorism" was dropped from public heart disease-the leading killer in America," is immeasurably higher. In an address at Cornell University, former President Clinton stated:
Half the world is living on less than $2 a day. A billion people live on less than a dollar a day. A billion people go to bed hungry every night. A billion and a half people never get a single clean glass of water in their lives. . . . One in four of all people who will perish on Earth this year will die of AIDS, TB, malaria and infections related to diarrhea."
However, in comparison to Quadrant 1, the populace utility is not as low because it was not subjected to the negative consequences of periodic threat warnings. In Quadrant 4, government does not emphasize threat warnings and there is no terror strike. The public obtains the highest payoff, and the payoff should be higher than Quadrant 2 because the citizenry was not subjected to warnings or under a possible false perception about the danger. With these premises, values, and reasoning, it is expected that government will choose to accentuate threats amid uncertainty since political payoffs will likely be higher whether or not there is an attack. If there was an attack, the government forecasted correctly and warned even though it was not prevented; and if there was no attack, the government may conceive an aura that adequate security is being provided (even if this belief is inaccurate). Moreover, from a utilitarian perspective, government might be able to reduce the possibility of attack because it seems more acceptable to the populace to permit intensified collective security measures, detentions, interrogations, and other measures when security danger appears higher. However, this may compromise individual rights, something that the populace might not condone but for the perception of peril. It also forms an immense pool of wrongly confined individuals as suspected terrorists, i.e. false positives.
In the case at hand, the uncertainty is whether the threat was as dire as the Bush Administration presented, which is largely unconfirmed even today as the full data may bide in national security secrecy prerogatives. However, the lack of prosecutions suggests that the threat was not so importunate. Likewise, it would seem that there are comparatively more grievous dangers facing the world than terrorism, but elevating jeopardy makes the threat cognitively available. Additionally, with a heightened domestic threat level, citizens may be more prone to accept the credibility of other alleged national security threats, such as from Iraq, which did indeed encompass the same time period surveyed in this article.
